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Throughout the 1990s, the Army Reserve found itself increasingly challenged to maintain its assigned end of year personnel strength objective. The reason for this challenge was runaway attrition. The aggregate Army Reserve attrition rate reached an unprecedented 34%
(37% for enlisted) in 1994. 1 The response to this flood of Soldiers leaving through the "back door" was to increase recruiting mission; try to push more Soldiers through the "front door".
This was expensive as well as futile, as each new accession cost approximately $60K. 2 Simply to continue to increase the recruiting mission did not seem to be a satisfactory answer.
Something needed to be done about the attrition problem in the Army Reserve.
This paper examines the Army Reserve's response to the attrition problem, which was the establishment of the Retention and Transition Program and the 79V Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The program was conceived "on the fly", with unprogrammed personnel and financial requirements and fundamental disagreements about exactly how the 79V Soldiers were to be utilized in the field. The program has had six Chiefs in its eight years of existence, each of whom maintained a similar vision of utilizing the 79V Soldiers to assist unit commanders to create a positive training environment and influence Soldiers to continue serving in the Army
Reserve through effective sponsorship, accountability, and career counseling. The degree to which the retention and transition force has been used to support this retention vision has, however, varied over the years due to external influences and direction.
Bruce Tuckman's well-known "Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing" Model of team development seems to describe the phases the retention and transition program has progressed through, and I will use it to organize this paper. I utilize this model somewhat arbitrarily, however, as it was intended to apply more to the dynamics of small group behavior.
The transitions between phases had, in the case of the Retention and Transition Program, little to do with group dynamics and much to do with changes in focus from higher echelons.
The Army Reserve faces a unique challenge in retaining its Soldiers. In a 1991 report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, the United States General
Accounting Office noted that "many of the problems in the reserve components are an inherent aspect of the reserve environment. Because reserve service is, in essence, a second job for most of the reservists, competing demands of their regular jobs and leisure time are important factors in attrition." The report continues to note that "DoD has no uniform policy for dealing with reservists who fail to honor their obligation to participate in inactive duty training. Realistic Most analysis pointed to a dearth in leadership at the first line leader level as being the most addressable factor in high attrition rates. Higher operational tempo, increased possibility of activation, low incentives, and other named causes were consistently trumped by leadership issues. When questioned about why they stopped coming to drill, Soldiers consistently cited lack of training opportunities, boring drill assemblies that had little to do with developing or maintaining combat readiness, and simply a feeling that their leaders did not know or care about them. The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) Retention Program was developed to address these issues by improving and focusing unit level leadership on three sub-programs:
sponsorship, soldier accountability, and career counseling.
The unit sponsorship program ensured each Soldier's first experience in the unit was a positive one, and that the Soldier was assimilated as rapidly as possible into the team. This seems self-evident in the active component, where unit level sponsorship is an ingrained norm.
In the Army Reserve, it seemed difficult to generate the same sense of responsibility for subordinate Soldiers in junior leaders. Seasoned retention NCOs in the 1990s became accustomed to visiting units at drills and proceeding straight to "the sucking wall" -the wall that seemed to draw new Soldiers who didn't know what to do or who to ask. It was not uncommon for Soldiers to not even know who their first line leader was.
The soldier accountability program simply required that first line leaders know where their Soldiers were. This is a basic leader responsibility that had lapsed badly in the Army Reserve.
First line leaders in the active component don't need to be told that they need to know the whereabouts and condition of their Soldiers. Indeed, supervisors in any enterprise can be expected to be concerned and attempt to contact employees who don't show up for work.
Things had gotten to the point in the Army Reserve where first line leaders just assumed a missing subordinate had decided not to come to drill that month. The well-known story of the Army Reserve Soldier who was hospitalized for several months after a car accident and was transferred by his unit to the IRR as an unsatisfactory participant may be an "urban myth", but it is one that was quite believable. The soldier accountability program required first line leaders to immediately contact Soldiers who were absent from drill to determine and document the reason.
In fact, first line leaders were encouraged to contact their Soldiers before drill to confirm intended attendance, attempt to overcome any difficulties the Soldier anticipated in making the drill, or to arrange for an RST (rescheduled training) if the Soldier required it. • U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) had not met its recruiting mission and the cost of recruiting was continuing to escalate.
• Enlisted attrition was at its highest level in recent history (37%).
• Resources and focus for recruiting and retention programs for the Army Reserve were not balanced. $40M and approximately 2100 AGR Soldiers and civilians were directed each year towards recruiting. $2M and less that 300 AGR Soldiers were focused on retention.
• New accessions cost approximately $60K per Soldier, while prior service accessions (from the IRR) cost approximately $6K. 7 In 1996 The Chief, Army Reserve requested the same team produce a staff assessment of the options necessary to bring the recruiting, retention, and transition (from the IRR to TPU) programs to a point that the processes would make meeting the end strength possible. Upon reviewing this assessment, the Chief directed:
• Remove the Retention Program from the purview of the [Strength Management] staff and make it a commander's program.
• Create a scorecard for commanders that includes metrics for retention. Clearly, command emphasis had reversed the upward trend of attrition, though it must be noted that this same emphasis may have caused some "holding of losses"; for while attrition dropped the Army Reserves' participation rate also decreased, indicating that some Soldiers who had stopped coming to drill had not been transferred to the IRR as required.
In 1998 center based full-time retention support a reality, a sometimes bitter and always counterproductive debate emerged concerning the "transition" aspect of the new 79V job description.
This debate hinged on the differences between the well developed and understood "recruiting" skill set used by recruiters and what was expected of the retention and transition NCO. What did "transition" mean? Was it synonymous to recruiting?
The intent and vision of OCAR-RTD for the retention and transition NCO was consistently retention-centric. The shortfalls in personnel strength were more due to high attrition than low accessions, and in any case it was far preferable to retain more trained Soldiers than to recruit new ones. The USARC Retention Program was designed to correct key deficiencies in sponsorship, Soldier accountability, and career counseling. When this program received strong command emphasis beginning in 1998, positive results followed. It was clear however, that this positive trend was not likely to be sustainable without a vast increase in full-time retention
Soldiers in the field to assist commanders in implementing and sustaining the program.
As stated earlier in this paper, the quest for the additional AGR manpower to make the presence of a full-time retention Soldier at every unit for every drill a reality, led inevitably to USAREC and the AGR recruiters assigned to it. The Chief of the Army Reserve owned these AGR recruiters, but the political reality was that he could not recover them without also relieving USAREC of an equivalent portion of their recruiting mission. This portion of the recruiting mission; the "bill", as it were, was the IRR-TPU mission.
The "bill" for Fiscal Year 2001 was 5000 transfers from the IRR to TPUs. OCAR-RTD distributed this mission across the existing 79V force, with most of it (3408) falling on the 81st
RSC's newly expanded 79V force. This required a monthly "write rate" of over two. Each 79V
Center Retention and Transition NCO would have to complete two or more IRR-TPU transfers each month. This was the same rate that had been maintained by USAREC's 79R recruiters.
Unless the AGR 79Rs had been grossly mismanaged, it could not be reasonably expected that once converted to 79V, they could continue to recruit at the same pace while also serving as full-time retention NCOs.
Disagreement over how to best achieve the IRR-TPU mission was an immediate source of friction between OCAR-RTD and the 81st. OCAR-RTD envisioned the new 79V's interaction with Soldiers in the IRR to be one of counseling rather than recruiting. Each 79V would be responsible for knowing and counseling the IRR Soldiers in his local area. He would approach each IRR Soldier as a career counselor would:
• learning why the Soldier is in the IRR.
• determining what conditions in the Soldier's life needed to change to warrant a transition into a TPU.
• keeping the Soldier informed of all opportunities for service in the Selected Reserve, to include the warrant officer program, direct commissioning, the AGR program, etc.
• at the very least, securing a reenlistment decision from the Soldier to maintain his status as a mobilization asset in the IRR.
In short, the 79V would extend the retention program to the Soldiers of the IRR. If successful, the result would be a more robust IRR, a truly "ready" component of the Ready Reserve, and a source of trained Soldiers to be approached to fill critical vacancies in units.
OCAR-RTD did not envision approaching the IRR as a recruiter would. Indeed, OCAR-RTD was careful to exclude the term "recruiting" from anything having to do with the 79V MOS.
79Vs would "transition" Soldiers between the IRR and TPUs. The IRR would be a personnel resource to be cultivated rather than merely harvested, and not simply a list of prospects for recruitment. IRR Soldiers would not be "recruited", they would be more closely managed and when opportunity and desire to serve in a TPU merged, they would "transition" between the IRR and the SELRES (TPU/AGR/IMA). This orientation is clearly evident in the 1999 version of USARC Regulation 140-6, which directs in paragraph 7-2 (Prospecting) the 79V to make "every effort to contact the [IRR] soldiers to ensure they are provided an opportunity to continue service in a TPU, if desired." 19 This was not a recruiting orientation.
There may have been some officers at OCAR-RTD who believed the 79V force could "transition" Soldiers from the IRR at the same rate that USAREC had recruited them, but most did not. Certain that this enormous plus-up of retention Soldiers in the field would result in a significant improvement in retention, OCAR-RTD leaders felt justified in accepting risk in the IRR-TPU mission. The overall objective of the program was to maintain end strength, and the IRR-TPU mission was just one of three ways to achieve that objective. If USAREC would meet its non-prior service recruiting mission for the Army Reserve, while the new 79V force got a grip on the attrition problem, a shortfall in the IRR-TPU mission would be irrelevant.
The Commanding General of the 81st RSC saw things differently. Although himself a strong believer in the merits and potential of the retention program, he saw the IRR-TPU mission not as a goal to pay lip service to, but a commitment to the Congress, 20 and one of the most important tasks in the Army Reserve. In short, it was a critical mission that would be accomplished in full. Having once served as an Army recruiter himself, Major General Mike Mayo knew that accomplishing this mission would require a 100% recruiting effort by his 79Vs, using recruiting tactics in a sales-oriented approach based entirely on numbers and not on the needs of the units or Soldiers involved. In the 81st RSC, "transition" was no more an acceptable term for what the 79Vs were doing than "recruiting" was at OCAR-RTD.
This disconnect had immediate implications. In addition to the unavoidably chaotic situation brought about in the 81st by this sudden fielding of such a large and high priority force, there resulted:
• A serious morale challenge in the 81st. Former 79R recruiters found that far from being relieved of recruiting duties, they were doing the same thing again with fewer resources. The rest of the 81st RTF was composed of newly "hired"
AGRs, who had been told that their job would be to counsel TPU Soldiers, not recruit IRR Soldiers. None of them were happy about having to be recruiters, and very few of them were prepared for such work. The IRR-SELRES mission must go. As long as there is a requirement placed on a 79V
to transfer a certain number of Soldiers from the IRR into the Selected Reserve, the 79V will be encouraged (if not coerced) to achieve that number even at the expense of his supported units' and the IRR Soldiers' best interests. There is nothing wrong or immoral about the way Army recruiters go about their task of convincing young people to join the Army or prior-service Soldiers to join units, but the "sales orientation" required for successful recruiting is not compatible to the career counseling responsibilities of the 79V. The 79V, acting with a recruiting orientation instead of as an "honest broker" is prone to take actions that are not congruent to unit or Soldier readiness. Some of these actions include:
• Forcing unsuitable IRR Soldiers on unit commanders, possibly even with the unit commander or unit administrator knowing they are getting a "bad apple". This is particularly likely when pressure to achieve an IRR-SELRES mission has come from the very top down the chain of command to the unit commanders. In the 81st RSC, under Major General Mayo, this was referred to as "jamming the door open".
• Similarly to the above case, forcing unit commanders to accept IRR transfers into positions that the Soldier is not qualified for (a "will train" accession), or forcing units to accept double, triple, or even quadruple slotting of IRR transfers into positions that are filled already, simply to achieve the transfer mission.
• Tempting unscrupulous 79Vs to limit "recovery efforts" of TPU Soldiers heading for a transfer to the IRR for unsatisfactory participation, only so they can then transfer them back to the same or other unit.
• Encouraging 79Vs to approach IRR Soldiers merely as "prospects" for transfer to a TPU, rather than as Soldiers to be counseled. Most Soldiers are in the IRR for a reason, and if that reason has not been addressed and corrected it serves little purpose to transfer the Soldier into a TPU.
• Encouraging 79Vs to extend their "prospecting net" far from their location in an attempt to meet a mission number. There were no boundaries for IRR prospecting in USAREC, but for the 79V to really be acting in the best interests of the IRR Soldiers and his units he should not be arranging transfers of Soldiers he does not know into units he has never seen.
• Causing 79Vs to work counter to the current guidance of the Chief of the Army Reserve to separate unsuitable Soldiers rather than taking the easy way out and transferring them to the IRR. A hard-pressed 79V is tempted to advocate the transfer so that his prospecting pool will grow by one.
Unfortunately, one of the second order effects of USARC's success in demonstrating the same capability to effect IRR-TPU transfers as had USAREC, is that the IRR-SELRES mission is now firmly associated with AR-RTD. The staff at AR-RTD seems to have recognized that they can rid themselves of this mission only if someone else is willing to take it. 33 This development is not likely -it is a difficult mission. Only direction from the very top is likely to cause this mission to disappear entirely or be transferred to another agency. In order to achieve this, AR-RTD needs to demonstrate a "value added", just as they did in 1999 when they pledged to do a better job recruiting IRR Soldiers if USAREC would give up a large share of the AGR recruiting force. There are two such "value added" offers to make to the Chief of the Army
Reserve.
The Soldiers of the IRR sorely lack any sort of dedicated career management, and the retention and transition force is ideally suited to assist in this role. Human Resources Command (HRC) is charged with providing "life cycle management" of the IRR, but is not staffed to even begin to meet this task. • 6% are AGRs or currently on active duty with another branch of the service.
• 8% have already ETS'd.
• 12% are receiving medical disability.
• 2% are not otherwise qualified to serve on active duty.
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It is not uncommon for 79Vs to be missioned to transfer between 50-100% (or more) of that subset of their assigned portion of the IRR that is contactable and eligible for duty in a SELRES, just to make their mission for the year.
The IRR is a Ready Reserve asset that is not nearly as "ready" as the published numbers indicate. Getting a grip on the IRR will be an enormous undertaking, but it seems to be of strategic consequence during our extended campaign against transnational terrorism, and 79Vs can be the key to realizing success. The first step is a simply stated but difficult to implement paradigm shift. Soldiers must not believe that their military obligation ends when they reach the IRR. IRR Soldiers should be required to report to a reserve center once each year to update their records. This could be a paid duty day, reminiscent of the old IRR Muster
Program, and the 79V at the reserve center would be the point of contact. Soldiers who fail to make this annual appointment should be subject to discharge from the Army Reserve under other than honorable conditions. The idea of gaining the cooperation of the Internal Revenue
Service to match unknown addresses to known social security numbers should to be seriously The 79V's efforts could be managed by examining his units' attrition rates, nonparticipation rates, reenlistment rates, size of this TTHS account, and the number of local IRR members he maintains a detailed folder on. The 79V's effectiveness, however, should only be measured by the personnel readiness of his units.
